Job Market Paper:
Sequential Protest Formation.
People participate in protests even though it is costly, their participation has a negligible impact on the outcome, and the benefits are not exclusive to participants. I propose a framework where people choose optimally to participate, even if the number of potential protesters is arbitrarily large. Opportunities to participate arrive stochastically over time, and the protest succeeds if participation surpasses a threshold. A player with an opportunity becomes pivotal if, after choosing not to join, it is likely that the protest will end before another opportunity arrives.
Download. R&R at AEJ: micro
Optimal play in sequential games often requires a high level of sophistication. Although simple behavioral rules may not deliver the best possible outcome, they may be preferred over optimal play because their implementation requires little effort. I propose a new type of game---a simplification game---that incorporates the intrinsic human tendency towards simplicity into the sequential games' framework. Specifically, Players' preferences are assumed to depend on the game's outcome and the complexity of their strategies. Existence results are provided for the usual equilibrium concepts. Furthermore, I provide two applications of simplification games: i) as a tool to rationalize individuals' mistakes in empirical applications of games, and ii) as a mechanism for equilibrium refinement.
Multi-dimensional Delegation with Large Disagreement.
We consider a delegation problem in which the agent possesses private information regarding the desirability of a multidimensional action, and ask what outcomes the principal can achieve if there is one dimension with an arbitrarily large bias. We show that there is a mechanism in which the action implemented in the dimension with substantial disagreement approaches the principal's preferred uninformed action as this disagreement grows large. In any other dimension, the principal's payoff approaches the level attained under full information. Our findings suggest that a significant discrepancy in one dimension enables the disclosure of information across all other dimensions.
Joint with Sofia Moroni. Download (coming soon).
The role of endogenous payoff over public coordination equilibrium.
This paper explores the influence of a potential protest on governmental spending decisions. The government aims to select a policy that maximizes its payoff, based on two factors: (1) the policy itself, and (2) the result of an imminent protest. Before deciding whether to protest, citizens observe the chosen policy and receive private signals about the government's strength. We provide an equilibrium where citizens base their decisions solely on public information. Our findings indicate that when the government's payoff is influenced not just by the outcome of a protest but also by its magnitude, the set of equilibrium strategies becomes narrower.
Joint with Pedro Jara. Download.
Work in progress:
Problems, Solutions, and Revolutions.
Experimental Evidence of Sequential Protest Formation, joint with Bea Ahumada.
Social Movements in Democratic Regimes, joint with Pedro Jara.
Sniping in Proxy Auctions with Deadlines, joint with Adam Kapor and Sofia Moroni.