Sequential Protest Formation.

People participate in protests even though it is costly, their participation has a negligible impact on the outcome, and the benefits are not exclusive to participants. I propose a framework where people choose optimally to participate, even if the number of potential protesters is arbitrarily large. Opportunities to participate arrive stochastically over time, and the protest succeeds if participation surpasses a threshold.  A player with an opportunity becomes pivotal if, after choosing not to join,  it is likely that the protest will end before another opportunity arrives. 

Download. R&R at AEJ: micro (New version)

Complexity  Equilibrium.

Optimal play in sequential games often requires a high degree of sophistication. However, in practice, people tend to prefer simpler strategies, even if those strategies do not lead to the best results. In this paper, we introduce κ-Complexity Equilibrium and Complexity Equilibrium, novel equilibrium concepts for finite sequential games that explicitly incorporate the intrinsic human preference for simplicity. We establish existence results for both equilibria and illustrate their practical value by: (i) showing that Complexity Equilibrium is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium, where the selected equilibria are determined by a tradeoff between strategic complexity and payoffs; and (ii) using κ-Complexity Equilibrium to explain individuals’ apparent mistakes in empirical applications of games.

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Multi-dimensional Delegation with Large   Disagreement.

We consider a delegation problem in which the agent possesses private information regarding the desirability of a multidimensional action, and ask what outcomes the principal can achieve if there is one dimension with an arbitrarily large bias. We show that there is a mechanism in which the action implemented in the dimension with substantial disagreement approaches the principal's preferred uninformed action as this disagreement grows large. In any other dimension,  the principal's payoff approaches the level attained under full information. Our findings suggest that a significant discrepancy in one dimension enables the disclosure of information across all other dimensions.

Joint with Sofia Moroni. Download (coming soon).

The role of endogenous payoff over public    coordination equilibrium. 

This paper explores the influence of a potential protest on governmental spending decisions. The government aims to select a policy that maximizes its payoff, based on two factors: (1) the policy itself,  and (2) the result of an imminent protest. Before deciding whether to protest, citizens observe the chosen policy and receive private signals about the government's strength. We provide an equilibrium where citizens base their decisions solely on public information. Our findings indicate that when the government's payoff is influenced not just by the outcome of a protest but also by its magnitude, the set of equilibrium strategies becomes narrower.

Joint with Pedro Jara. Download.

• Practical Considerations for Questionable IVs, with Damian Clarke.

Stata Journal 18(3):663-691 (2018). Download.